The Indian NCTC should not aspire to become a
super-intelligence organisation. Rather, it should aim at coordinating with
other stake holders to ensure unity of effort.
Vikram Sood Delhi
Vikram Sood Delhi
It took the United States less than three years after the
9/11 attacks to get its National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) up and away.
From our first major internationally organised terror attack in Mumbai in March
1993 it took us 17 years to think of setting up a similar centre. During these
17 years we went through a series of internationally organised high profile
terror attacks. We did establish another agency as we always did after every
crisis. After Kargil we established a Multi Agency Centre as recommended
by the GC Saxena intelligence task force. This failed to deliver because the
wonderful concept could not be implemented properly. It merely ended up
being another office of the Intelligence Bureau.
The urgency to do something was apparent after the Mumbai
massacre in November 2008. Like the WTC attack in the US, Mumbai 26/11 was
about "us" because there was no such empathy after the several high
profile serial attacks in the country. We hurriedly established the NIA in
order perhaps to be seen to be doing something although this organization was
in no way going to stop terrorist attacks. Now that there is talk that an
Indian version of the NCTC is on the anvil, many wonder what shape it would
take.
There are two aspects that it must not attempt. One, aspire
to become a super-intelligence organization and following from this, take over
the operational aspects of intelligence organizations. Intelligence agencies
have far wider briefs than only ensuring national security arising from
terrorist threats. What it must, however, do is to co-ordinate, evaluate and
analyse all intelligence reports that relate to terrorism. The NCTC must then
decide on a course of action and task the intelligence agency or any special
forces that are available for whatever action is necessary to abort the
terrorist mission. Intelligence agencies must not become a part or even
subordinate to the NCTC. They would function best in their existing role with
greater coordination (not the easiest of tasks, admittedly) at the NCTC.
The US NCTC, for instance, integrates all
foreign and domestic analysis to produce detailed assessments designed to
support senior policymakers and other members of the policy, intelligence,
SIGINT, ELINT, TECHINT, law enforcement, defense, homeland security, and
foreign affairs communities. These include items for the President's Daily
Brief (PDB) and the daily National Terrorism Bulletin (NTB). Besides this, the
US NCTC is required to conduct strategic operational planning for counter
terrorism activities, integrate all instruments of national power, including
diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, and law enforcement to ensure
unity of effort. This is a tough ask and sounds difficult even in theory.
Despite the
best of regulations, problems of coordination, ego battles and struggles for
turf will always remain. It would thus be left to the genius of leadership to
handle them. The best of superstructures will be rendered ineffective if the
intelligence inputs are below par and the response mechanism from detection,
pre-emption, prevention and destruction are flawed. Sound intelligence is a
powerful tool in the hands of decision makers but they also must be understood
that there are limitations. It cannot predict the future with certainty but
can, with experience and understanding of the subject, provide the ability to
see behind the wall. In the case of terrorism, where the enemy is invisible and
unpredictable, this is the most difficult task.
The NCTC
should be located institutionally in the system independent of personalities
involved. In India we may think of a ministry of internal security with both
the Coordinator of Intelligence and intelligence chiefs reporting to the Prime
Minister with sections of their organisations co-ordinating with this new ministry.
The author
was the head of RAW from 2001 to 2003
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