The basic structure
theory plays a useful part in our constitutional jurisprudence. But was there
truly a judicial formulation by the Supreme Court of India of the basic
structure doctrine in the Kesavananda Bharati case? An insider's unravelling of
a fascinating story.
THIRTY-FOUR years ago,
on April 24, 1973, thirteen judges of the Supreme Court assembled in the Chief
Justice's court packed to its capacity with lawyers and laypersons. They
delivered eleven judgments in India's most celebrated case in constitutional
law the Kesavananda Bharati case. For over three decades we have believed that
in that case a majority of judges decided that Parliament has no power to amend
the basic structure of the Constitution.
Revelations of how the
Kesavananda case was decided have been disclosed in later interviews with those
who were involved in the case, writings of scholars, and by a revealing
autobiography of Justice Jaganmohan Reddy, one of the judges in that case. This
writer, a counsel in the case, kept detailed notes of the proceedings of the
case. We can now piece together a collated account of how the case was decided.
At the end of it, the question arises was there truly a judicial formulation of
the theory of basic structure in that case, as it has come to mean today; and
was the case decided in an atmosphere conducive to a detached determination of
a highly contentious matter with political overtones?
To reverse the Golak
Nath case (1967), which had held that Parliament had no power to amend
fundamental rights, and in anticipation of a major constitutional battle, we
now know that the government carefully selected some judges who would not be
obstructive to its reversal. The case became a contest not only between the
rival parties but apparently among some of the judges who were committed to
their own strong views on Parliament's power to amend the Constitution. Justice
Jaganmohan Reddy records this about some his colleagues: "I got the
impression [from the first day] that minds were closed and views were
determined."
The case was
essentially a political fight in a court of law with a political background. It
was conducted under continuous and intense pressure the likes of which it is
hoped will never be seen again. One author has described the atmosphere of the
court as "poisonous." A judge on the bench later spoke about the
"unusual happenings" in the case. If the several "unusual
happenings" in the case are related in detail, they will make one doubt if
the decision in the case was truly a judicial one expected from judges with
detachment from the results of the controversy before them.
On April 24, 1973, the
eleven separate judgments were delivered by nine judges; collectively these ran
into more than 1000 printed pages. Six judges Chief Justice S.M. Sikri and
Justices J.M. Shelat, K.S. Hegde, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, A.N. Grover, and S.
Mukherjea were of the opinion that Parliament's power was limited because of
implied and inherent limitations in the Constitution, including those in
fundamental rights. Six other judges Justices A.N. Ray, D.G. Palekar, K.K.
Mathew, S.N. Dwivedi, M.H. Beg, and Y.V. Chandrachud were of the opinion that
there were no limitations at all on Parliament's power to amend the
Constitution. But one judge Justice H.R. Khanna took neither side. He held that
Parliament had the full power of amending the Constitution; but because it had
the power only "to amend," it must leave "the basic structure or
framework of the Constitution" intact. It was a hopelessly divided verdict
after all the labour and contest of five months. No majority, no minority,
nobody could say what was the verdict.
How was it then said
that the Court by a majority held that Parliament had no power to amend the
basic structure of the Constitution? Thereby hangs a tale not generally known.
Immediately after the eleven judges finished reading their judgments, Chief
Justice Sikri, in whose opinion Parliament's power was limited by inherent and
implied limitations, passed on a hastily prepared paper called a "View of
the Majority" for signatures by the thirteen judges on the bench. One of
the conclusions in the "View of the Majority" was that "Parliament
did not have the power to amend the basic structure or framework of the
Constitution." This was lifted from one of the conclusions in the judgment
of Justice H.R. Khanna. Nine judges signed the statement in court. Four others
refused to sign it.
By any reading of the
eleven judgments, this conclusion could not have been the view of the majority.
It was only the view of one judge Justice H.R. Khanna. Some judges had no time
to read all the eleven judgments as they were prepared under great constraints
of time owing to the retirement of the Chief Justice the next day. Justice
Chandrachud confessed that he had a chance hurriedly to read four draft
judgments of his colleagues. No conference was called of all judges for finding
out the majority view. The one conference called by the Chief Justice excluded
those judges who were of the opinion that there were no limitations on the
amending powers. Nor was the conclusion debated in court, as it ought to have
been. The Chief Justice's action has been described by some as an act of statesmanship.
Others believe it was a manoeuvre to create a majority that did not exist.
The verdict would have
remained in this uncertain state but for accidental events following the
decision. On August 1, 1975, with lightning speed and by an outrageous abuse of
the amending power during the Emergency, Parliament made the 39th Amendment to
the Constitution. This introduced Article 329 A of the Constitution which
sought to validate Indira Gandhi's election set aside by a judge of the
Allahabad High Court without any contest, including her pending appeal in the
Supreme Court.
On August 11, 1975,
Indira Gandhi's election appeal against her disqualification was heard by five
judges presided over by Chief Justice A.N. Ray. He had been appointed Chief
Justice of India by the government the day after the judgments in the
Kesavanada case superseding three other judges who had decided against the
unlimited power of Parliament to amend the Constitution. The government
believed that with the amendment to Article 329A of the Constitution, her
appeal would simply be allowed. But so outrageous was the amendment that all
five judges declared it bad as it violated "the basic structure."
Nevertheless, Indira Gandhi's appeal was allowed by an amendment made to the Representation
of the People Act, 1951, which cured all illegalities in her election. The
court could strike down constitutional law but not an ordinary law that carried
out the same purpose. To many this seemed perplexing.
Everyone took it that
the court had now approved the basic structure theory by striking down the
amendment to Article 329A everyone, that is, except Chief Justice A.N. Ray. He
had stated in Indira Gandhi's case that the hearing would proceed "on the
assumption that it was not necessary to challenge the majority view in
Kesavananda Bharati case." On November 9, 1975, two days after the Indira
Gandhi case was decided, the Chief Justice constituted a new bench of thirteen
judges to review the Kesavananda Bharati case.
For two days, N.A.
Palkhivala made the most eloquent and passionate argument against the review.
On November 12, the third day, the Chief Justice announced suddenly at the very
outset of hearing: "The bench is dissolved." Thus ended an inglorious
attempt to review the Kesavananda judgment. Whatever the reasons for the
dissolution of the bench, Chief Justice Ray's maladroit attempt to review the
basic structure limitation gave it a legitimacy that no subsequent affirmation
of it could have given.
But the problem could
not be avoided. In 1980, in the Minerva Mills case, the question was raised
whether there was indeed a majority view on the limitation of the basic
structure. Justice Bhagwati said that the statement signed by nine judges had
no legal effect at all and could not be regarded as the law declared by the
Supreme Court. He said the so-called majority view was an unusual exercise that
could not have been done by judges who had ceased to have any function after
delivering their judgments and who had no time to read the judgments. However
Justice Bhagwati relieved himself from deciding what he called "a
troublesome question" by saying that Indira Gandhi's case had accepted the
majority view that Parliament's power of amendment was limited. This was not
correct as that case was decided on the assumption that it was not necessary to
challenge the majority view.
So a single judge's
opinion Justice Khanna's of a limitation of the basic structure on Parliament's
power has passed off as the law. But Justice Khanna was responsible for another
vital dimension of the basic structure two years after the case was decided. In
the Kesavananda case, he did not say that fundamental rights were part of the
basic structure of the Constitution, although six other judges said that and
the case was entirely about the validity of amending fundamental rights by the
challenged constitutional amendments. Three of Justice Khanna's brother judges
in the Kesavananda case were clearly of the opinion that Justice Khanna had not
held that fundamental rights were part of the basic structure in the
Kesavananda Bharati case.
But in Indira Gandhi's
election case two years later, Justice Khanna "clarified" his
judgment in the Kesavananda case. He now said that he had given clear
indications in his judgment that fundamental rights were part of the basic
structure. By so clarifying his judgment, Justice Khanna did not realise that
this clarification rendered his judgment in the Kesavananda case hopelessly
self-contradictory, as he had held unconditionally valid two constitutional
amendments that nullified vital fundamental rights. With that dubious exercise,
Justice Khanna's "clarification" is now a vital part of the basic
structure. Fundamental rights are now immune to an amendment if it violates the
basic structure of the Constitution.
In the latest judgment,
delivered on January 11, 2007, by nine judges of the Court on the Ninth
Schedule to the Constitution, the basic structure limitation has been stated to
be "an axiom of our constitutional law." An axiom means a self-evident
truth. So be it. Whatever its origins, the basic structure theory plays a
useful part in our constitutional jurisprudence. Parliament does not and should
not have an unlimited power to amend the Constitution. However, in the
glorification of the basic structure theory, it is important to bear in mind
its infirm roots and how predilections and prejudices of judges, chance, and
accidental circumstances have played a greater part rather than any logic or
conscious formulation of it.
(The writer is a former
Solicitor-General of India. This article is based on his lecture, which was
presided over by Lok Sabha Speaker Somnath Chatterjee, to the Supreme Court Bar
Association on April 4, 2007.)
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