Indian Ocean – Checkmating China

Currently, the Indian Ocean is a hotbed of conflicting interests for the two major South Asian political and economic rivals viz India and China. While India rightly looks upon the Indian Ocean as its backyard with tremendous strategic importance, China has thrown down the gauntlet in its bid to claim political and commercial hegemony and naval supremacy among the countries of the Indian Ocean region.

Riding on a burgeoning volume of international trade and a booming military might, it has been on a spree of acquiring strategic assets in the form of ports in many countries across and beyond the region and setting up bases, like in Bangladesh (Chittagong), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Seychelles, Pakistan (Gwadar), Kenya (Lamu) and Tanzania (Bagamoyo). Called the ‘String of Pearls’ by Western sources, these ports would purportedly enable China to secure its commercial interests in the procurement of raw materials and sources of energy for its energy deficient economy.

A likely scenario to emerge over the years in the Chinese scheme of things is that the dependence of theworld on crude oil will increase manifold; keeping pace with the demand in oil will be the control of China over the Indian Ocean. It has accordingly aligned its foreign and defence policies to ensure its economic success the world over and emergence as a market leader.Naval BasesAlthough China claims that the underlying motive of the Pearls of ports is purely an economic one viz to ensure its maritime interests for energy security, the current ground realities in the Indian Ocean throw up a different kind of indicator, making the communist country’s intentions appear far from innocuous. China has set up electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal, and funded construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand. It has entered into a military agreement with Cambodia and has been building up forces in the South China Sea.
The Gwadar deep sea port in Pakistan provides China with a ‘listening post’ from where it can monitor Indian activities in the Arabian Sea. China can patrol the Indian Ocean sea-lanes for its security of shipments. It has a naval base on Hainan Island that can hold submarines, which pose a major threat to the US, but could be a threat to India too. China has dismissed reports of any plans of creating military bases overseas, but Chinese maritime strategists such as Shen Dingli advocate the need for China to set up overseas military bases.

China would not fight shy of protecting its energy imports that pass through the Indian Ocean. Nor is it comfortable with Washington and New Delhi being the security providers in the region. Inability to sustain troops in the region would leave a chink in its armour, which would mean that China’s energy imports would be highly vulnerable in the event of a military standoff with either the US or India.

Being already embroiled in maritime disputes with several countries in the South and East China seas over the ownership of islands, China is wary of the possibility of the Indian Ocean waters becoming another contentious area at some point of time in the future; in the absence of an effective blue-water Navy to protect its commercial and political interests.


Ruffling Indian Feathers

China has raised India’s hackles by docking submarines at the port of Colombo in Sri Lanka. India’s concerns have been further raised by the expansion of Chinese maritime powers with the development of aircraft carrier battle groups. Currently, China has the largest aircraft carrier in Asia. And alarm bells rang when Chinese nuclear submarines carried out patrols in the Bay of Bengal. The possible presence of Chinese nuclear missiles so close to its coastline was a matter of utmost concern to India’s nuclear deterrence.


India and the US

The first salvo of a resurgent India under the Narendra Modi government in response to a belligerent China’s ambitious maritime agenda being aggressively pushed forward by that country was fired soon after Modi became Prime Minister and visited the US in September 2014. Prominent among the issues discussed by the Indian leader with President Obama was maritime security of all nations to peacefully carry out their trade activities in the Indian Ocean.

During the visit of President Obama to India in January 2015, the two leaders reaffirmed “the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea”. They also called “on all parties to avoid the threat or use of force” in maritime disputes. China sharply reacted to an India-US joint statement referring to the disputes in the South China Sea, saying that only the countries involved in the disputes should work together to resolve the problems.

“At the current stage, the situation in the South China Sea is generally stable and there is no problem with navigational freedom and freedom of flights,” the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said. According to political observers, Modi perceives a greater role for India in Asian affairs in pursuance of his policy of “Act East”, coinciding with Obama’s own pivot to Asia policy. Events after Modi assumed office as Prime Minister, have contributed to bringing India and the US toward a consensus on China.


India and Japan

During his August 2014 visit to Japan, Modi and his Japanese counterpart reaffirmed the importance of upgrading and strengthening of defence relations between the two countries in their strategic partnership. Keeping a wary eye on a rising China, the two leaders agreed to accelerate talks on the possible sale of an amphibious aircraft to India. The coming together of the two countries in matters of strategic partnership was seen by political observers as a bold initiative on the part of India and Japan to redefine the balance of power in the region and counter the ambitious expansionist policy of China.

India’s Extended Neighbourhood

India has extended its neighbourhood beyond the South Asian region where it has its presence in the Southeast and Indo-Pacific region. The Southeast Asian states have evinced interest in India by playing an active role in the region to counter the dominant Chinese position. India in recent years has strengthened its relations in the Southeast Asian region in pursuance of its ‘Look East Policy’ launched in the 1990s and reinvigorated and renamed under the Modi government as ‘Act East Policy’. India has integrated the Pacific in its extended neighbourhood concept. It has signaled that its Act East Policy was not limited to Southeast Asia, but goes beyond that to Australia and other Pacific Ocean nations.

India is not interested in taking on China in a direct confrontation. However, Chinese imperialist designs may succeed in uniting the countries of the Southeast Asian region. China would not be inclined to bargain for such a situation as it would be difficult for it to contend with. Any alignment of interest in the region would significantly affect the balance of power, posing serious consequences for all nations. India’s growing technological advances (with the launch of Agni-V) has placed it amongst an elite group of nations. This in itself has far-reaching consequences for the States in the region.


Strengthening Bilateral Relations with Island Nations

With a view to countering China, India has upgraded its military ties with Maldives, Madagascar and Myanmar in the Indian Ocean and with Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia and Japan. India has also enhanced its economic and security relations with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia.

In order to counter China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean, India has its naval presence in the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Malaysia launched defence cooperation with India by signing a memorandum of understanding in 1993. Defence cooperation between the two countries has been revived in 2008. Since then India has had a substantive military mission in Malaysia, focusing on training pilots and air force personnel.

Singapore has emerged as the closest security partner of India in the East, given its critical location in the Strait of Malacca at the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Thailand is holding joint naval exercise with Indian Navy and under the comprehensive MoU signed in 2005 they are regularly conducting exercises in the area adjacent to their international maritime boundary lines. India is increasing its defence cooperation with Indonesia after the related cooperation agreement of 2001.

Australia and India concluded a pact on joint naval exercise in 2005 and a more comprehensive memorandum of understanding on maritime security cooperation in 2006. And during the visit of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd to India in November 2009, both sides agreed to enhance their defence interaction, with a special emphasis on naval cooperation. Furthermore, India has signed agreements to develop infrastructure with two Indian Ocean countries, Mauritius and Seychelles in their two islands – Agalega and Assumption.


India and Maldives

Despite its geographical proximity to India and having historically been within India’s sphere of strategic influence, Maldives has increasingly been strengthening its relationship with Beijing. Chinese investments in the Maldives have increased over the years, ranging from housing projects to other infrastructure projects such as building roads and airports. This has become a major cause of concern for New Delhi.


India and Seychelles

Location of Seychelles and its proximity to the coast of Africa makes it a lucrative option for Beijing to establish a naval base in that country. China is already participating in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and has growing economic interests in Africa. However, India and Seychelles share close military ties as New Delhi helps the island nation secure its EEZ by presenting surveillance aircrafts and patrolling ships.


India and Sri Lanka

The previous government of Mahinda Rajapaksa appeared fairly China-friendly, awarding many infrastructure development projects to Beijing. The Maithripala Sirisena government is now reviewing all Chinese investments in the country, especially the US$1.5 billion port city project. The Sirisena government has also reassured India that such “incidents, from whatever quarter, do not take place under our tenure”.


India and Mauritius

As Mauritius looks to attract investments from China, India is stepping up its game by providing a 1,300-tonne Indian-built patrol vessel, the Barracuda, to Mauritius to help the island nation protect its coastline. While India may not indulge in any China containment policy, New Delhi realizes it is absolutely crucial to reengage with these islands and secure its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region.


China’s Stated Position

While affirming that it has no plans to set up naval bases in the countries of the Indian Ocean region, China has warned that the Indian Ocean could end up “as an ocean of conflict and trouble” if countries like India, the US and China itself failed to engage with each other more constructively as their interests begin to overlap.


India’s Call

This is an opportune moment for India which has achieved political stability under Narendra Modi’s leadership to expand trade with China and to go all out for the settlement of the border issue. With support from regional countries and associations, India can play a decisive role in the region and the world. To this end, it is imperative that India take pro-active measures to engage China in dialogues for settling its long standing border disputes with that country. It is an established fact that China would only involve itself in any meaningful exercise of resolution of disputes when the adversary nation is politically stable, economically vibrant and militarily formidable.

India should strive and acquire the required edge under the present dispensation in the country and emerge as a strong enough partner nation, to do business with China. Needless to say, despite the Western orientation of India’s foreign policy in recent times, India should accord top priority to its own interests while dealing with a militarily and economically stronger China which views the West with suspicion. And acquisition of an early Permanent Member status in the United Nations Security Council would set India in the same league as China, which is an essential prerequisite for checkmating the latter in the Indian Ocean.

Source :http://defencenews.in

INDIA’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE: REVIEWING NFU AND MASSIVE RETALIATION – ANALYSIS

The BJP’s election manifesto had promised to review India’s nuclear doctrine to “make it relevant to challenges of current times…” Regardless of election-time rhetoric, it is necessary that important government policies must be reviewed periodically with a view to re-validating their key features.

India had declared itself a state-armed with nuclear weapons after a series of nuclear tests at Pokhran, Rajasthan, on 11 and 13 May 1998. India’s deterrence is premised on the dictum that nuclear weapons are political weapons and not weapons of warfighting and that their sole purpose is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by India’s adversaries. A draft nuclear doctrine was prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) chaired by the late K Subrahmanyam and handed over to the government on 17 August 1999.

After a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the government issued a statement on 04 January 2003 spelling out India’s nuclear doctrine. The government statement said that India will build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent; follow a ‘No First Use’ posture; and, will use nuclear weapons only “in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.” It was also stated that nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage; nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear weapon states; and, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against it with biological or chemical weapons.

Criticism of the nuclear doctrine has mainly been centred on a few key issues: NFU will result in unacceptably high initial casualties and damage to Indian population, cities and infrastructure; ‘massive’ retaliation is not credible, especially against a tactical nuclear strike on Indian forces on the adversary’s own territory; and nuclear retaliation for chemical or biological attack would be illogical, especially as the attack may be by non-state actors.

Several Indian analysts have been critical of the NFU posture since its acceptance by the government. Recently, Lt Gen (Retd) BS Nagal, former C-in-C, Strategic Forces Command (SFC), has questioned the efficacy of the NFU doctrine. According to him, “It is time to review our policy of NFU… (the) choices are ambiguity or first use.” He gives six reasons for seeking a change: NFU implies acceptance of large-scale destruction in a first strike; the Indian public is not in sync with the government’s NFU policy and the nation is not psychologically prepared; it would be morally wrong – the leadership has no right to place the population ‘in peril’; NFU allows the adversary’s nuclear forces to escape punishment as retaliatory strikes will have to be counter value in nature; an elaborate and costly ballistic missiles defence (BMD) system would be required to defend against a first strike; and, escalation control is not possible once nuclear exchanges begin. (“Checks and Balances”, Force, June 2014.)

The most common scenarios normally considered appropriate for first use include first use by way of pre-emption based on intelligence warning, or during launch on warning (LoW) or launch through attack (LTA). In all of these, there are no easy answers to some obvious questions: What if intelligence regarding an imminent first strike is wrong? Can the destruction of the adversary’s cities be justified on suspicion of imminent launch? The adversary’s surviving nuclear weapons will be employed to successfully target major Indian cities. Is it worth risking Delhi, Mumbai and other cities for dubious gains?

Major military reverses during war are also offered as a justifiable reason for the first use of nuclear weapons. In none of the traditional worst-case scenarios, for example the cutting off of the Pathankot-Jammu national highway NH-1A somewhere near Samba by the Pakistan army, is the situation likely to become so critical as to justify escalation to nuclear levels by way of a first strike as sufficient reserves are available to restore an adverse situation.

The NFU posture is strategically logical and rational on several counts. It has led to major diplomatic gains, including the lifting of sanctions, civil nuclear cooperation agreements and accommodation in multilateral nuclear export control regimes. Most of these gains will be frittered away if India opts for first use. Complex command and control and sophisticated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems are necessary for a first use posture. A first use posture will deny India the opportunity to engage in conventional warfare below the nuclear threshold if it becomes necessary. First use will lower the nuclear threshold and make the use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) more likely. And, South Asia will again be dubbed a ‘nuclear flashpoint’; this will encourage international meddling and will discourage investment.

Deterrence is ultimately a mind game. The essence of deterrence is that it must not be allowed to break down. India’s nuclear doctrine must enhance and not undermine nuclear deterrence. It emerges clearly that NFU is still an appropriate posture for India’s nuclear doctrine. However, the word ‘massive’ in the government statement should be substituted with ‘punitive’ as massive is not credible and limits retaliatory options. The threat of nuclear retaliation against chemical and biological attack should be dropped from the doctrine. The credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine needs to be substantially enhanced through appropriate signalling.

Source : http://defencenews.in/default.aspx

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