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Showing posts with label Nuclear. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nuclear. Show all posts

Monday, February 16, 2015

India and the CTBT

India’s future with the CTBT is still unwritten. Leadership until now may have been delayed, but there are opportunities for it to be reengaged and renewed
India’s past with the treaty to ban all nuclear tests in all places for all time is well known. Some might characterise it as leadership defaulted or, more optimistically, merely delayed. A lot has changed for India since the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in 1996, and the same is true for the treaty itself — enough to prompt fresh thinking about some renewed engagement.
India did not support the treaty in 1996 — and still does not — but it had been very supportive during negotiations. The roots of that exuberance can be traced to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s famous initiative in 1954 for a “standstill agreement” on nuclear testing. His intervention came at a time when the U.S. and the Soviet Union were detonating powerful nuclear weapons with increasing frequency. Nehru played an important role in building international momentum for the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which India joined. This treaty significantly reduced global levels of fallout, but did little to constrain the nuclear arms race. The CTBT was created as a result.
It has been hard in recent years to discern a public debate on the CTBT in India. This is tragic in the very country that made the path-breaking call for the “standstill agreement”; has been observing a unilateral moratorium since 1998; is a champion of nuclear disarmament; and, in the words of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, “will continue to contribute to the strengthening of the global non-proliferation efforts.” For all of its efforts in galvanising the creation of an effective international verification system, India is currently unable to derive either the political or the technical benefits from it. But 183 other countries do.
The CTBT with its 183 signatories and 163 ratifications is one of the most widely supported arms-control treaties. This near universal support is due to the treaty’s non-discriminatory nature, where everyone has the same obligation never to conduct a nuclear explosion. As another mark of progress, the prohibition against testing has emerged as an established global political and behavioural norm. The international condemnation of North Korea as the only country that has conducted nuclear tests in this millennium is a vivid illustration.
After each of the North Korean nuclear tests, all CTBT State Signatories received the same high-quality information about the location, magnitude, depth and time of the event within hours of detection by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation’s (CTBTO) system of monitoring stations.
CTBTO has evolved from a mere blueprint to the custodian of the world’s largest and most sophisticated multilateral verification system. Over 300 stations in 89 countries have been built to monitor for signs of nuclear explosions around the globe and round the clock. The International Monitoring System (IMS) monitors the Earth’s crust, listens in the atmosphere and in the oceans and sniffs the air for traces of radioactivity. While scanning the globe for signs of a nuclear test, this monitoring system produces data that have many spin-off applications, from disaster early warning to scientific research on the Earth’s inner structures, climate change or meteors, to name just a few of the potential uses.
Nuclear safety

CTBTO is also making contributions to the nuclear safety field. After the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, CTBTO data provided timely information on the radioactive emissions from the crippled plant and their global dispersion.
In spite of all these achievements, the CTBT has yet to become global law due to its demanding entry into force clause, which requires the signature and ratification of all 44 countries listed as nuclear technology capable. At present, eight of those countries are yet to join: India, Pakistan and North Korea are the only non-signatories from this list.
Before India even signs the CTBT, it can reacquaint itself with today’s global nuclear test ban, while making an important contribution to the multilateral verification system. Radionuclide stations, which “sniff out” radioactive particles and noble gases, are the only means to confirm a nuclear explosion. In particular, the radionuclide station still sought for India to host is vital to finishing the now 90 per cent complete IMS, which is already highly effective in detecting nuclear explosions.
The IMS has also facilitated a rich international exchange of data and expertise and boosted technological advancements pertaining to infrasound and noble gas monitoring. Additionally, the CTBTO has an active programme of engagement with the international scientific community who can tap into a wealth of data generated by the IMS, and civil and scientific applications are booming. India should be part of this.
Science should support diplomacy. Today, a first step toward reengagement would be for relevant scientific and other government institutions to initiate contact with the CTBTO for the purpose of beginning scientific cooperation. This could eventually lead to India participating in the international exchange of data from the monitoring stations and would be an important first step to establishing familiarity and trust.
Taking these initial steps within the scientific context is wholly consistent with India’s standing in the 21st century as it looks to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. Scientific cooperation is crucial for sustainable dialogue. Interactions between scientists serve to promote cross-border exchanges and can become a precursor for greater engagement. One avenue for engagement takes place this June in Vienna at the CTBT: the Science and Technology Conference 2015, which is the world’s largest scientific forum on nuclear-test-ban verification and its other benefits. Encouragingly, Indian scientists attended the last conference and I look forward to welcoming more this year.
India’s future with the CTBT is still unwritten. Leadership until now may have been delayed, but there are opportunities for it to be reengaged and renewed.

(Courtesy: UN Information Centre for India and Bhutan)
(Lassina Zerbo is Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), based in Vienna, Austria.)


PROFITABILITY WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY

With the Indian government acting in favour of the nuclear industry, contrary to the interests of potential victims of a disaster, the question of liability deserves greater attention

In its efforts to promote nuclear commerce with the United States, the Narendra Modi government has run into a dichotomy that lies at the heart of this industry. While multinational nuclear suppliers, such as G.E. and Westinghouse publicly insist that their products are extraordinarily safe, they are adamant that they will not accept any liability should an accident occur at one of their reactors. The joint announcement by Mr. Modi and U.S. President Barack Obama last month raised concerns that the government would move to effectively indemnify suppliers, contrary to the interests of potential victims. The list of “frequently asked questions” (FAQs) on nuclear liability released by the Ministry of External Affairs on February 8 confirms the suspicion that the Modi government is trying to reinterpret India’s liability law by executive fiat in order to protect nuclear vendors.

The government has disingenuously suggested that it achieved the recent “breakthrough” by establishing an insurance pool to support suppliers. However, to focus on this arrangement is to miss the wood for the trees as even a cursory analysis of the economics of nuclear plants shows.

A section in the Indian law called the “right of recourse” allows the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) to claim compensation from suppliers up to a maximum of Rs.1,500 crore ($240 million). This pales in comparison with the total cost of the six planned Westinghouse reactors at Mithi Virdi in Gujarat; estimates from similar plants under construction in the U.S. suggest that this may be as high as Rs.2.5 lakh crore. In the U.S., all nuclear plant operators must have third-party insurance for at least $375 million, and suppliers could easily set aside a small portion of their profits to do the same for reactors sold in India.

Problematic principle

What suppliers are worried about is not the amount, but the principle. More concretely, if the law places some responsibility on suppliers, then a future Indian government could use this to gain leverage by forcing them to pay substantially more for a serious disaster. Moreover, their executives could be held accountable under other civil and criminal statutes in India. The FAQs released by the government are meant to reassure nuclear vendors on these counts.

The FAQs claim that the provision allowing the NPCIL a right of recourse “is to be read … in the context of … the contract between the operator and supplier.” This goes beyond the law, where the right of recourse exists independently of a contract.

In 2010, when a parliamentary standing committee suggested such a linkage, its recommendation was rejected by the Cabinet after a public outcry. Although the FAQs later state that “a provision that was expressly excluded from the statute cannot be read into the statute by interpretation,” this is precisely what the government is doing here.

The FAQs suggest that the government is also committed to the interests of the public sector NPCIL which “would insist that ... contracts contain provisions that provide for a right of recourse consistent with Rule 24 of CLND Rules of 2011.” However, this is a cunning sleight of hand. A central element of these rules is that “the provision for right of recourse … shall be for the duration of initial license,” which is usually granted only for five years. In contrast, the promised lifetime of modern reactors is 60 years, and failure rates tend to increase in later years. Therefore, linking the right of recourse to a contract is an attempt to water down supplier liability to a meaningless level.

“Just because the Manmohan Singh government accepted the Faustian Indo-U.S. nuclear pact does not mean that India needs to bend its laws and spend billions of dollars on U.S. reactors”

The FAQs also declare that suppliers cannot be “asked to pay more compensation in the future … than currently provided under the law.” However, this ignores the fact that the law itself has a provision for revising liability, which states that “the Central Government may … from time to time … specify, by notification, a higher amount.”

A revision of the cap with time is only natural. Several decades from now, Rs. 1,500 crore may be worth much less than it is currently. Therefore, the government’s move to perpetually limit supplier liability to this nominal amount defies basic economic principles, and implies that victims will receive a lower compensation, in real terms, for future accidents.

Finally, the FAQs assert that the liability act, ipso facto, takes away the rights of victims to sue suppliers even under other laws. If this interpretation of the law is correct, then it implies that suppliers cannot be prosecuted even for criminal negligence.

Double standards
This provides a striking example of double standards. Under U.S. law, suppliers can be held legally responsible for accidents. Consequently, for decades, the U.S. refused to join any international convention that would require it to legally indemnify suppliers. When it engineered the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, it inserted a “grandfather clause” to ensure that it would not have to alter its own law. In contrast, the Indian government seems willing to meekly surrender the rights of its citizens.

It is sometimes argued that India must make these concessions to “repay” the U.S. for its help in facilitating India’s access to international nuclear commerce. U.S. policymakers pushed for such access in a calculated attempt to induce India to support its geostrategic objectives and to ensure that U.S. companies would have access to the emerging Indian nuclear market. However, just because the Manmohan Singh government accepted this Faustian pact — and even cast an unconscionable vote against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency — does not mean that the country needs to repay this self-serving “favour” endlessly by bending its laws and spending billions of dollars on U.S. reactors.

Although the question of liability is somewhat abstruse, it deserves greater public attention because it serves as a clear lens to understand the central conflict involved in India’s nuclear expansion: the desire of nuclear vendors to have profitability without accountability and the interests of ordinary people who could be potential victims. The government’s attempt to resolve this conflict in favour of the industry is a revealing indicator of its priorities.


(M.V. Ramana and Suvrat Raju are physicists with the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace. Ramana is the author of The Power of Promise: Examining Nuclear Energy in India, 2012.)

Analysis: From Team work for CSE-2015

What portion it will fill
________________________
GS -3
1/ infrastructure- energy
2/ science and technology development and their impacts on everyday life.
3/ Disaster and disaster management.
4/ Environmental pollution and degradation
5/ role of external state and non state actors and creating challenges to internal security.
GS --1
------
6/Distribution of major resources.
Essence of the editorial
________________________
Provision of " Right to recourse ".
__________________________
It compels the suppliers to pay to NPCIL in case of failure or accident.
Why the suppliers protest against it
________________________
A/ Under Indian law ; this " right of recourse " is signed between suppliers and NPCIL under a contract but in Western countries it is independent of any contract.
B/ Under Indian law there is a chance to make suppliers and executives to be more liable and punishable in future.
What is the ground of criticism from Indian side
___________________________
1/ The " right of recourse " is only for initial 5 years.
What is the problem here ?
_________________________
A/ The life of a nuclear plant is 60 years. The failure of nuclear plant might come towards the last part. In that case compelling suppliers only for 5 years is meaningless.
B/ It is dangerous both to NPCIL and victims. The latter will be hugely affected by this provision.
2/ Indian law prevents victims filing cases against suppliers while US government strictly observe this rule where under strict provision victims can file suit against suppliers.
Why this is leverage to suppliers ?
_______________________________
As believed ; US has greater role in making india a nuclear enriched country. So ; this kind of flexibility is to suppliers.
How it will help us ?
_________________
1/ It gives us light about energy related issues fulfilling topic 1.
2/ it says impact of any accident by nuclear plant and development of indigenous nuclear technology and fulfills topic 2+3
3/ you can extract about possible environment pollution related with nuclear plant thus fulfilling topic 4.
4/ It gives us light to consider security issue of nuclear plant and possible threat of non state actors to nuclear sector fulfilling topic 5.
5/ we can search for major nuclear deposits in world along with india thus fulfilling topic 5.
Subjectives
------------
Q/ The southern coast of India is said to be deposit golden sand-- why?
Q/ Recently NGT banned mining of sand ore in southern coast-- why ?
Q/ What is rare earth materials ? Narrate the environmental pollution caused by rare earth material with reference to major countries dealing with it.
Q/ There is a need to regulate NGO run by foreign aid through strict law. Consider the statement under the controversy of Kalpakkam.
Q/ Write a short note on the nuclear resources of india.
GS--4
--------
You are president of a NGO working for protection of environment. You are a nuclear scientist. A nuclear power plant is going to establish in your region. A public outcry is already in out.
What you will do in such cases as a nuclear scientist as well as a president of NGO for protection of environment ?
Objectives
___________
1/Correct
A/ Domiasiat is the largest sandstone type uranium deposit in khasi hills in arunachal.
B/ A peculiar type of bacteria exist here.
1/ both
2/ none
3/ a
4/ b
2/ correct decreasing order regarding the position of their utilisation in india--
A/ Electricity energy; thermal; hydro and renewable energy; nuclear energy.
B/ electricity energy; hydro n renewable energy; thermal; nuclear energy..
C/ Electricity energy; thermal; nuclear; hydro and renewable energy.
3/ arrange the following in decreasing order of their deposit of uranium.
A/ Tummalapalle; chitrial; peddagattu; rohil
B/ rohil; chitrial; tummalalpalle; peddagattu.
4/ correct
A/ Rare earth materials are very rare in earth.
B/ They are 17 materials found in periodic table like scandium and yttrium and difficult to extract.
C/ Extracting rare earth materials causes huge scale environment pollution and china and Malaysia are the example of it.
1/ all
2/ ab
3/ bc
4/ ac
5/ correct
A/ monazite is a rare earth material found in southern coast sand of india.
B/ it is mixed up with thorium.
C/ India has rare earth material treaty with japan
D/ Rare earth materil is used from mobile to laptop.
E/ singhbhum in bihar has
1/ all
2/ abc
3/ bce
4/ abde
Major nuclear power plants in India
_________________________
Kaiga--karnataka
Kalpakkam-- Tamilnadu
Kakrapara -- gujrat
Raeathbhata -- Rajasthan
Tarapur-- Maharashtra
Narora-- uttar pradesh.
I have furnished an article on nuclear law.
After the Nuclear Cooperation treaty with US india has to create a domestic law to find consonance with the Convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage ( CSG) as india has not ratified the CSG treaty. To enter into the global arena of nuclear power india legislates the Nuclear Liability Law of india but it is vehemently criticized on various grounds. This article tries to throw light on some grounds of criticism of the bill.
Liability cap
------------
The nuclear liability law caps the compensation to be paid by operator to the victims at a very minimum level. It breaches indian and international law on various grounds---
1/ Article 21 of indian constitution
_____________________
Protection of environment comes under the ambit of article 21 as it is related with right to life. A healthy environment is necessary for healthy life. The supreme court in Oleum gas leak case clearly mentions that an enterprise with hazardous process of producing any chemical or any hazardous substances that viable the integrity of environment is solely responsible to the compensation. From this point of view capping of the compensation amount of the nuclear operator and rest to be paid by the government violates the rule of Supreme court.
2/Indian law of full compensation
_______________________________
The Indian law provides for full compensation to any victim. This capping system violates this principle also.
3/Polluter pay principle
_____________________
Both indian law and international law says that it is the polluter who have to pay the ultimate price. Both law even says that an enterprise has to pay not only the compensation to victim but also to the price for environmental regeneration. In Indian council for enviro legal action Supreme court applies this principle that only the polluter will pay. From this point of view also; capping of compensation amount by the enterprise violates indian and international law.
4/ Propensity of the nuclear damage
_________________________
The damaged caused by a nuclear accident is enormous and it cant be fulfilled by a minimum capping amount as provided in India's Nuclear Liability Law.
5/ Government enterprise
_________________________
One section of society accuse that pushing the enterprise only to liability without nuclear supplier is to attract the foreign investment in nuclear field. In india; the enterprise is government controlled. So; ultimate responsibility remains with the government.
6/Burden on tax payer
____________________
Besides these; to fulfill the rest compensated amount by the government; government might have to increase the the tax on its citizens.
7/No mention of cap
__________________
The convention of supplementary compensation for nuclear damage act (CSG) doesn't mention about any cap as a condition to entry into the nuclear suppliers group and no other country who are part of this convention has provided such cap.
Other grounds of criticism
---------------------------
1/ The bill provides a ground to sue the nuclear supplier if it is proved that any incident has been occured due to the negligency of nuclear supplier group. It prevents the foreign nuclear companies to invest in indian nuclear field.
2/ The bill relieves the nuclear operator from liability if accident is due to cause of natural disaster; terrorism and armed conflict. It invites utter threats to the life of millions of people.
Some legal grounds of criticism regarding conflicting clause of the Nuclear Liability law
------------------------------
Clause 6 and emanating controversy
________________________
According to this clause the operator can claim any liability from manufacturer and supplier in case of nuclear accident if it is written in the contract. But here the operator is Nuclear Power Corporation of India which itself is a government owned enterprise. So; in that case; to cope up with current situation government can put up a new bill or mayvamend the existing bill that might go against the victims.
Controversy regarding clause 18
______________________________
The clause 18 of the nuclear liability bill maximizes the time of 10 years under which a victim has to file a complaint while it is well known to all that it is a very short duration of time because DNA of human bodies expresses nuclear related syndromes upto a long time along with several mismatches caused by nuclear disaster.
Controversy regarding clause 35
_______________________________
Thr clause 35 of the nuclear liability law provides that only nuclear damage claim commissioner can run the trial of operator or responsible person liable to the accident without any provision of civil court. It is contrary to the counterpart of US where accused are tried under civil court. It also conflicts with indian law.
Controversy regarding clause 17 and other deprivation of victim's rights
____________________________
The nuclear liability bill provides utmost responsibility to determine the claim of victims to the Nuclear damage commissioner.Not only this; the clause 17 of the bill prohibits the victims from filing any case against liable persons which can be done only by the operator that is NPCIL. It also prohibits the victims from filing any cases against the order of nuclear damage commissioner. It violates the civil rights of citizens.
Solution
--------
From international front
____________________
As said by foreign nuclear companies and the US government the section 17 (b) and 46 of the Nuclear Liability Law that provides strict legal action against the nuclear suppliers in case of default of any mechanism or equipment is neither mentioned in CSG treaty nor mentioned in law of the countries who are party to the convention.
To resolve the problem; without diluting the provision but a much rationalised provision can be added diplomatically.
In case of insurance stalemate; a perfect risk management system combining insurance pool of indian insurance companies and US insurance companies can solve the matter.
From domestic front
____________________
After the Bhopal gas incident the domestic problems that might atise by such hazardous industry should be concerned effectively. A proper compensation system considering the propensity of such huge loss caused by nuclear accident and with inclusion of a longer time period to file suit can mitigate the problem. The inclusion of civil court in the trial process will add transparency and also will be in resonance with indian law.
India needs clean energy to appear on equal foot with other developed countries. Nuclear energy can pave this way for india. But a highly effective protection system with utterly responsible government machinery along with adequate law is necessary for a balancing nuclear power in india.
Questions to try
----------------
1/ The nuclear liability law of india conflicts with the indian as well as international law-- exemplify.
2/ The nuclear liability law of india deprives the indians from entertaining fundamental rights-- put forward valid reasons.


Friday, January 23, 2015

Disposal of Nuclear Wastes in India



Management of radioactive waste in Indian context includes all types of radioactive wastes generated from the entire nuclear fuel cycle and also from installations using radionuclides in medicine, industry and research. In the choice of processes and technologies adopted utmost emphasis is given to waste minimisation and volume reduction. The comprehensive radioactive waste management operations are carried out fulfilling all prescribed regulatory requirements.
Nuclear waste is classified into high, intermediate and low levels depending on the level of radioactivity in it. The spent fuel which contains long lived radioisotopes are stored for a long period to reduce the level of radioactivity and subsequently reprocessed at reprocessing plants for collecting fissile elements. The generation of high level waste is at reprocessing plants. The quantity of this waste in our country is much smaller due to our adoption of the closed fuel cycle.
High level waste generated from the reprocessing plant is vitrified into a glassy form, contained in multiple barrier containers and stored for an interim period of three to four decades in engineered vaults with necessary surveillance facilities. After cooling down in these storage facilities, waste containers will be stored for long term in deep geological repositories.
Reprocessing and Waste Management plants are currently being operated by Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC).
The low and intermediate level nuclear waste containing radioactive substances with short half life are generated at nuclear power plants and are processed at the site in the following manner:
§  The generated waste is solidified by fixing this in materials like cement, polymers, glass etc., to ensure that it does not move
§  The solidified waste is then stored in specially fabricated double walled high integrity stainless steel container
§  The containers containing the solidified waste are stored inside a high integrity concrete pit at each of the nuclear power plant site
As the waste is fixed in cement, glass, polymer; it is immobilized and its placement in high integrity containers inside a pit ensures that the radioactive wastes is completely insulated from the environment.
The radioactivity level of the stored wastes reduces with time and by the end of the plant life, including decommissioning falls to normal levels. Such facilities for handling low and intermediate level waste are located at all the nuclear power stations viz. Tarapur (Maharashtra), Rawatbhata (Rajasthan), Kalpakkam (Tamilnadu), Narora (Uttar Pradesh), Kakrapar (Gujarat) and Kaiga (Karnataka). The quantity of low and intermediate level waste to be stored at site during the life time including decommissioning is within 0.15 cubic meters/year/MW.
The Government is using latest technology for disposing the nuclear waste generated during operation of nuclear power plants. The details are as follows:
§  The low and intermediate level radioactive waste generated during operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants is segregated, its volume reduced using various technologies and solidified. This solid/solidified waste is packaged in suitable containers to facilitate handling, transport and disposal
§  Disposal of low and intermediate level waste is carried out in specially constructed structures such as stone lined trenches, reinforced concrete trenches and tile holes. These disposal structures are located both above and underground in access-controlled areas. Disposal system is designed based on multi barrier principle for ensuring effective containment of the radioactivity. The areas where the disposal structures are located are kept under constant surveillance with the help of bore-wells laid out in a planned manner. The underground soil and water samples from these bore wells are routinely monitored to confirm effective confinement of radioactivity present in the disposed waste.
§  Gaseous waste is treated at the source of generation. The techniques used are adsorption on activated charcoal and filtration by high efficiency particulate air filters. The treated gases are then diluted with exhaust air and discharged through a tall stack with monitoring.
§  Liquid waste streams are treated by various techniques, such as filtration, adsorption, chemical treatment, thermal and solar evaporation, ion exchange, reverse osmosis etc. The concentrate from treatment of liquid waste is immobilized in inert materials like cement, polymer etc.

The nuclear waste handling, treatment, storage and disposal is carried out as per the well laid down procedures and guidelines stipulated by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB).

Friday, August 23, 2013

Nuclear deterrence is overrated

The real risks and costs of having these weapons, both monetary and human, far outweigh their security benefits

The Indian Navy has figured in three recent, global news items. The launch of the indigenously developed aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, expected to be operational by 2018, makes India only the fifth country after the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France to have such capability. The diesel-electric submarine INSSindhurakshak caught fire and exploded, causing the tragic death of 18 crew. In the early hours of August 10, the reactor on the nuclear powered submarine INS Arihant (“slayer of enemies”), with underwater ballistic launch capability, went critical.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his wife, Gursharan Kaur, launched the 6,000-tonneArihant in Visakhapatnam on July 26, 2009. In time, it was said, with a fleet of five nuclear-powered submarines and three to four aircraft carrier battle groups, a 35-squadron air force and land-based weapons systems, India would emerge as a major force in the Indian Ocean, from the Middle East to Southeast Asia.
The strategic rationale is to acquire and consolidate the three legs of land, air and sea-based nuclear weapons to underpin the policy of nuclear deterrence. Unfortunately, however, the whole concept of nuclear deterrence is deeply flawed.
Desensitised
Nuclear weapons are uniquely destructive and hence uniquely threatening to our common security. There is a compelling need to challenge and overcome the reigning complacency on the nuclear risks and dangers, to sensitise policy communities to the urgency and gravity of nuclear threats and the availability of non-nuclear alternatives as anchors of national and international security.
A nuclear catastrophe could destroy us any time. Because we have learnt to live with nuclear weapons for 68 years, we have become desensitised to the gravity and immediacy of the threat. The tyranny of complacency could yet exact a fearful price if we sleepwalk our way into a nuclear Armageddon. It really is long past time to lift the shroud of the mushroom cloud from the international body politic.
The normative taboo against this most indiscriminately inhumane weapon ever invented is so comprehensive and powerful that under no conceivable circumstances will its use against a non-nuclear state compensate for the political costs. This explains why nuclear powers have accepted defeat at the hands of non-nuclear states rather than escalate armed conflict to the nuclear level.
Nor can they be used for defence against nuclear-armed rivals. The mutual vulnerability of such rivals to second-strike retaliatory capability is so robust for the foreseeable future that any escalation through the nuclear threshold would be mutual national suicide.
Their only purpose and role, therefore, is mutual deterrence. In order to deter an attack by a more powerful nuclear adversary, a nuclear armed state must convince its stronger opponent of the ability and will to use nuclear weapons if attacked. But if the attack does occur, escalating to nuclear weapons will worsen the scale of military devastation even for the side initiating nuclear strikes. Because the stronger party believes this, the existence of nuclear weapons may add an extra element of caution, but does not guarantee immunity for the weaker party. If Mumbai or Delhi was hit by another major terrorist attack which India believed had Pakistan connections, the pressure for some form of retaliation could overwhelm any caution about Pakistan having nuclear weapons.
Limited India-Pakistan war
The putative security benefits of nuclear deterrence have to be assessed against the real risks, costs and constraints, including human and system errors. Modelling by atmospheric scientists shows that a limited, regional India-Pakistan nuclear war using 50 Hiroshima-size bombs each would, in addition to direct blast, heat and radiation deaths, severely disrupt global food production and markets and cause a nuclear war-induced famine that kills up to a billion people around the world.
The extra caution induced by the bomb means that the subcontinent’s nuclearisation raised the threshold of tolerance of Pakistan’s hostile mischief, like provocations on the Line of Control and cover for cross-border terrorism. Yet, India did not need to buy deterrence against China. The best available evidence shows that China’s nuclear weapons, doctrine, posture and deployment patterns are designed neither to coerce others nor to fight a nuclear war with the expectation of winning, but solely to counter any attempt at nuclear blackmail.
The role of nuclear weapons in having preserved the long peace of the Cold War is debatable. How do we assess the relative weight and potency of nuclear weapons, west European integration, and west European democratisation as explanatory variables in that long peace? There is no evidence that either side had the intention to attack but was deterred from doing so by the other side’s nuclear weapons. Moscow’s dramatic territorial expansion across eastern Europe behind Soviet Red Army lines took place in the years of U.S. atomic monopoly, 1945–49. Conversely, the Soviet Union imploded after, although not because of, gaining strategic parity.
Historical evidence
To those who nonetheless profess faith in the essential logic of nuclear deterrence, a simple question: are you prepared to prove your faith by supporting the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran in order to contribute to the peace and stability of the Middle East, which presently has only one nuclear-armed state?
It is equally contestable that nuclear weapons buy immunity for small states against attack by the powerful. The biggest elements of caution in attacking North Korea — if anyone has such intention — lies in uncertainty about how China would respond, followed by worries about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s conventional capability to hit populated parts of South Korea. Pyongyang’s puny arsenal of useable nuclear weapons is a distant third factor in the deterrence calculus.
Against the contestable claims of utility, there is considerable historical evidence that we averted a nuclear catastrophe during the Cold War as much owing to good luck as wise management. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis is the most graphic example of this. Australia’s most respected strategic analyst, former Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Dibb, argues that Moscow and Washington also came close to a nuclear war in 1983. Frighteningly, Washington was not even aware of this scare at the time and any nuclear war then would have used much more destructive firepower than in 1962.
Compared to the sophistication and reliability of the command and control systems of the two Cold War rivals, those of some of the contemporary nuclear-armed states are dangerously frail and brittle.
Nor do nuclear weapons buy defence on the cheap: the Arihant cannot substitute for the loss of theSindhurakshak. They can lead to the creation of a national security state with a premium on governmental secretiveness and reduced public accountability. In terms of opportunity costs, heavy military expenditure amounts to stealing from the poor. Nuclear weapons do not help to combat India’s real threats of Maoist insurgency, terrorism, poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition and corruption. Across the border especially, there is the added risk of proliferation to extremist elements through leakage, theft, state collapse and state capture.
NPT
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has kept the nuclear nightmare at bay for 45 years. The number of countries with nuclear weapons is still, just, in single digit. There has been substantial progress in reducing the numbers of nuclear warheads. But the threat is still acute with a combined stockpile of 17,000 nuclear weapons, 2,000 of them on high alert. The NPT’s three-way bargain between non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses is under strain. The Conference on Disarmament cannot agree on a work plan. The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty has not entered into force. Negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty are no nearer to starting. The export control regime was damaged by the India–U.S. civil nuclear agreement.
The net result? The world is perched precariously on the edge of the nuclear precipice. As long as anyone has nuclear weapons, others will want them; as long as nuclear weapons exist, they will be used again some day by design, accident, miscalculation or rogue launch; any nuclear exchange anywhere would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world. We need authoritative road maps to walk us back from the nuclear cliff to the relative safety of a progressively, less-heavily nuclearised, and eventually, a denuclearised world.
Our goal should be to make the transition from a world in which nuclear weapons are seen by some countries as central to maintaining security, to one where they become increasingly marginal, and eventually entirely unnecessary. Like chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons too cannot be disinvented. But like them, nuclear weapons too can be controlled, regulated, restricted and outlawed under an international regime that ensures strict compliance through effective and credible inspection, verification and enforcement.

(Ramesh Thakur is director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Australian National University. The article is based on a paper presented at the “Arms Control and Strategic Stability” conference in Beijing, August 8–9.)